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intentionality in musical improvisation
Tom Davis
Department of Creative Technology, Bournemouth University, Bournemouth, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the musician/instrument relationship through
exploring notions of mediated intentionality. Ihde’s [1990.
Technology and the Lifeworld. Bloomington: Indiana University Press]
writings are taken as a starting point for examining these human–
technology relationships with a particular focus on the
intentionality of the human-instrument construction. Notions of
instruments as mediators of intentionality are then examined from
a variety of standpoints found in improvisational practice, with a
focus on diﬀerent conceptions of mediation, instrumental
resistance and instrumental agency. Verbeek’s [2008. “Cyborg
Intentionality: Rethinking the Phenomenology of Human–
Technology Relations.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
7: 387–395] conception of Cyborg Intentionality is explored as one
way to extend these notions within a post-phenomenological
posthuman framework. To help contextualise this discussion the
author presents a performance system, the Feral Cello, whose
design has been informed by the above discussion. Verbeek’s
hybrid and composition notions of intentionality are used as a






As an instrument builder and improviser, I am interested in improvisational practices
that explicitly foreground technology as part of the performance aesthetic. I see
myself as working within a group of practitioners that explore technologically mediated
performance in which the agency of the technology becomes highlighted through the
act of performance, as part of the performance practice. Performers in this area (for
example Green (2013), Ferguson (2013), Borgo (2014), Stapleton (2008), Davis (2011);
Norman, Waisvisz, and Ryan 1998), often conceptualise their relationship with the
instrument as one of dialogue or resistance. Starting with a brief description of the
musical improvisation context and a recap of Ihde’s (1990) human–technology relations,
this paper seeks to examine the performer–instrument relationship in more detail. It
achieves this through exploiting the context of musical improvisation as a site of
enquiry in which the performer–instrument relationship is scrutinised as an explicit
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part of the creative practice. As part of this process, varying interpretations of musical
instruments are encountered ranging from a conception of instruments as ﬁxed objects
of frozen agency waiting to be activated, through to assemblages of technologies
whose boundaries are more ﬂuid. To further the understanding of these assemblages,
this paper employs Verbeek’s (2008) notion of Cyborg Intentionality, which extends
Ihde’s (1990) phenomenological modalities of relations to tools by its increased recog-
nition of the agency of the technology within the mediating process. In Verbeek’s con-
ception, technology is not just a mediator of human intentionality, but actually takes an
active role in contributing to the intentionality of the human–technology assembly.
Improvisational context
Pat Question: How does an improviser improvise?
Pat Answer: By developing and employing a repertoire of possibilities in order to risk the
unknown. (Corbett 1995, 225)
It is not the intention of this article to give a deﬁnitive deﬁnition of improvisation but
rather to provide a working understanding of the processes that are relevant to further
the discussion of the performer-instrument relationship. In improvisation, particularly
within a non-idiomatic or free improvisation1 context, there is a constant strive from the
performers to do something new within their performance practice. Improvisation in
this context is often deﬁned as the creation of the un-for-seen (Borgo 2005, 14) or compos-
ing in the moment, the act of live composition. This act of improvisation then, comes with
an act of risk, not necessarily the risk of playing something wrong; for example, not follow-
ing the notation correctly – but perhaps a deeper and more fundamental set of risks that
relate to the authenticity of the improvisational process, to truly play/create the un-for-
seen (Corbett 1995).
In an interview with Corbett (1995) Evan Parker outlines three risks that he sees arising
as part of the improvisational process.
Risk One – never get out there; can’t ﬁnd the wilderness. The Risk of Stagnation.
Risk Two – never come back; lost in the wilderness. The Risk of Insanity.
Risk Three – go full circle (and take audience with). The Risk of Completion.
Evan Parker. (as quoted in Corbett 1995, 223)
These risks emphasise the need of the improviser to enter into the unknown, to get
beyond their own mannerisms, beyond repeating a catalogue of what they can do, or
as Borgo puts it ‘to ﬁnd ways of improvising that release us from our habits’ (Borgo
2005, 21). Improvisers employ a number of techniques to facilitate this process but tend
to fall into one of two camps in their relationships to their instrument: Those that limit
themselves to the traditional ‘instruments of culture’ (Corbett 1995, 230) and push
against these boundaries through the use of extended playing techniques to make
anew and redeﬁne the resistive boundaries of the instrument; and those that seek to
‘deface, deconstruct and/or reconstruct’ (Corbett 1995, 230) the instrument to give a
sense of playing with something new each time. These diﬀerent approaches to improvisa-
tion suggest diﬀerent ways of conceiving the relationship between performer and instru-
ment. The next section will explore the diﬀerent ways in which instruments can be
conceived as mediators of performer intentionality.
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Mediated intentionality
As Verbeek (2015) notes, recent literature in the ﬁeld of Philosophy of Technology has
suggested that humans and technologies should not be interpreted as two separate enti-
ties between which interaction happens; but rather, that technologies and humans should
be understood as co-constituting entities that shape each other. As these human–technol-
ogy relations are situated within the world, it can be surmised that the technologies have a
role in the mediation of our experience with the world. Building on a Phenomenological
understanding of intentionality, such that our thoughts and beliefs are ‘characteristic of
being of or about something in the world’ (McIntyre and Smith 1989, 147), Verbeek
follows that human experience has an ‘intentional structure’ and argues that it is possible
for this intentionality to be mediated through technological artefacts (Verbeek 2008, 387).
Verbeek’s conception of mediated intentionality builds on previous work by Don Ihde and
although these notions have already been further developed by others, for example (Mag-
nusson 2009), it is worth shortly introducing Ihde here to provide a consistent grounding
for further discussion.
In Technology and Lifeworld (1990) Ihde opens his discussion of a Phenomenology of
Technics by examining the ‘various ways in which I-as-body interact with my environment
bymeans of technologies’ (Ihde 1990, 72). Through this examination of the diﬀerent ways in
which technologies can mediate our experience, Ihde sets out three categories of
mediation: Embodied; they become an extension of the human body: Hermeneutic; they
become representations of reality withwhichwe react & Alterity; they become terminations
of our experience (Verbeek 2008, 289). Ihde represents the three categories with the follow-
ing notation, in which the arrow represents the direction of human intentionality.
Embodied relations: (human – technology) → world
Hermeneutic relations: I → (Technology – world)
Alterity relations: I → Technology – (–world) (may or may not interact with the world).
(Ihde 1990, 107)
These relations can be summarised as an interpretation of technology as a transparent
object through which we interact with the world; technology as an object that represents
an element of the world which must be interpreted or read, and technology as an object
that we are interacting with and that we ascribe agency to. Although these relations are
presented here as distinct categories, it is important to note that Ihde’s human–technol-
ogy relations should not be interpreted as ﬁxed states, but rather, they describe a conti-
nuum of possible states. Following this, it is possible for any single interaction with
technology to go through multiple states along this continuum.
Musical instruments as passive mediators
Ihde directly addresses the notion of musical instruments as technological mediators in his
writing. Most often (1990 and 2007), he employs his embodied relation to categorise the
performer–instrument relationship.
It should be obvious that a very large use of musical instrumentation falls clearly into the
embodiment pattern. The player picks up the instrument (having learned to embody it)
and expressively produces the desired music:
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Player –> instrument –> Sound.
In Embodiment cases, the soundmaking instrument will be partially symbiotically embodied.
(Player-instrument) —> sound. (Ihde 1990, 95)
In Ihde’s conception, for an embodied experience to be achieved, the technical difﬁculties
of performing with the instrument have to be overcome through the development and
employment of instrumental technique. If this is achieved, the performance can be said
to have an air of effortless playing, where the distance between the musician’s intention
and the desired music collapses so that the instrument becomes a transparent vehicle for
musical expression. The instrument, in this case, could be understood as a passive, trans-
parent mediator of musical intention andmusical desire. The instrument can be thought of
as something purely instrumental, a means to an end, a tool for task completion. This con-
ception of the performer–instrument relationship is what Evens terms ‘old immediacy
theory’ (Evens 2005, 130). Evens provides the perceived ‘effortless’ playing of the virtuoso
pianist Rubinstein as an example:
It is true that Rubinstein projected an air of utter eﬀortlessness in his playing; he sat over the
keyboard executing the most technically challenging manoeuvres with relaxed aplomb, a
serene, even childlike look on his face, delighting in the music exactly as does a member of
the audience. He seemed to be watching his ﬁngers dance over the keys as though they
weren’t even his, charmed and surprised by the beautiful music emanating from the instru-
ment before him. (Evens 2005, 130)
This understanding of instrumental technique is similar to how Ihde categorises the
performer–instrument relationship in Technologies–Musics–Embodiments (2007):
A deeper analysis would go on to show that in the learning process, the shapes of experience
change: ﬁrst, struggles with playing the ﬂute yield sounds, but they are not reﬁned, gracile,
‘musical’. But as skill is acquired, the ﬂute is ‘mastered’ in that it withdraws or becomes
more and more transparent and the player is able to produce the sounds we hear as ﬂute-
music. (Ihde 2007, 11)
Both these descriptions describe the technical mastery of the instrumentalist overcoming
any physical difﬁculties of playing the instrument. In this construction, one could argue
that when the instrumental technique is highly developed the musical instrument itself
disappears so that there is no distance between the musical thoughts of the musician
and the sound that they can produce. In this understanding, the instrument can be
thought of as a direct conveyor of the performer’s intentionality.
Notions of instrumental resistance
In contrast to ‘old immediacy theory’, Evens also articulates an alternative understanding
of the performer-instrument relationship, one that recognises the existence and impor-
tance of a persistent instrumental resistance even in well-trained players.
the instrument does not mediate, does not stand between the musician and the music.
Neither does the instrument disappear, for it remains integral to the music, oﬀering itself to
the musician. (Evens 2005, 159)
In this instance, the instrumental technique is not employed in the mastery of the instru-
ment, to overcome its resistances, but rather ‘to place the instrument’s resistance in
greater contact with the musician’ (Evens 2005, 160). The development of an instrumental
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technique acts as a facilitator, bringing the resistances of the instrument and the perfor-
mer closer together, encouraging the ‘most efﬁcient meeting [of the performer] with
the instrument’s resistances’ (Evens 2005, 159).
Evens describes instrumental resistance as the physical ‘pushing back’ of the instru-
ment against the performer, the friction where the ‘hard surfaces of the instrument
meet the soft ﬂesh of the musician’ (Evens 2005, 159). As such, the resistance in this
instance is primarily from the physical interaction between the instrument and the perfor-
mer, one that is necessary for the performer to play, as, without resistance, the instrument
falls from the performers grasp. The aim of the performer then is to use the instrumental
technique to align themselves to the instrumental resistances, not so they overcome them,
but so they can get the most out of them.
In Contexts of/as Resistance, Sally-Jane Norman (2013) presents diﬀerent ways of con-
ceiving of musical instruments and their associated resistances. Norman starts by
deﬁning musical instruments in Schaﬀerian terms ‘as systems allowing the production
of a variety of sound objects while conveying a sense of causal constancy’ (Schaeﬀer
1966, 51 in Norman 2013, 276). Norman gives an example of a Stradivarius violin as an
embodiment of a kind of ‘frozen agency’ of both the craftsmanship used to create it
but also the virtuoso performance that it enables. Norman states that in the context of
a meaningful performance, ‘deﬁance of normative aﬀordances and patterns of use, gen-
erating friction and resistance, is integral to creative endeavour’ (Norman 2013, 281).
Norman outlines two ways in which these resistances can be exempliﬁed: either
through a virtuoso technique that ‘exceeds familiar instrumental possibilities’, which is
similar to Even’s conception above. Or alternatively, as manifest in ‘the disruption or hijack-
ing of instruments and/or their familiar uses, in contexts where human and non-human
actors are equal contributors’ (Norman 2013, 282). This later interpretation, a resistive, dis-
ruptive understanding of instrumentality is one that is often embraced by improvisers, par-
ticularly those within a non-idiomatic or free improvisation genre.
Whilst there is a large body of practitioners that leave the instrument alone, but develop
a virtuoso musicianship of extended techniques (Derek Bailey being a notable example
(Corbett 1995, 230)), Norman’s second manifestation of resistance as the ‘disruption and
hijacking of instruments and/or their familiar uses’ is one that is actively employed by a
growing range of improvisers. This approach, which has a lineage back to the 60s, is
one that has been actively employed more recently by those seeking to extend their per-
formance practice with the use of technology. Musicians drawing on areas of practice such
as circuit bending or DIY culture might be actively constructing or deconstructing their
instruments as part of the performance. Instruments, in this case, are rarely ﬁxed single
objects for activation; rather, they tend to be constructed or de-constructed from many
disparate elements. In such performances, these instrumental technologies are often fore-
grounded as part of the performance practice. This in turn, is suggestive of a diﬀerent con-
ception of the performer-instrument relationship than that of a frozen agency waiting to
be activated.
Instrumental intentionality
In The Meaning of Indeterminacy: Noise as Performance (2014), Klett and Gerber document a
culture of Noise Music that rejects notions of ‘virtuosic instrumentation and stylistic
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process’ and a concern from Noise Artists that instrumental mastery leads to improvisatory
stagnation (Klett and Gerber 2014, 7). Some Noise Artists feel that some instrumentalists
have so much performance knowledge that they have ‘exhausted the instrument’ (Klett
and Gerber 2014, 7). Klett and Gerber state that in contrast to this, the aesthetic of
Noise Music, which champions the resultant quality of sound over instrumental technique,
enables musicians to re-explore their instruments in new ways. With many Noise Artists
creating work in which the ‘instrument’ consists of complex systems of multiple
devices, and with notions of indeterminacy central to the genre, many artists see the
instrument as a collaborator in the creative process (Klett and Gerber 2014, 8).
A notion of collaboration with an instrument, the playing with real or attributed
agencies (Norman 2013) is prevalent in a growing body of improvisational practice.
To highlight a few examples: Stapleton’s (2008) Dialogic Instrument series explores
notions of resistances and mastery in performance contents through instrument
design. These are contextualised through an exploitation of Buber’s notion of dialogue
‘where the goal of dialogue is not homogeneity or the resolution of diﬀerence, but
instead a form of convivencia (a tense but productive co-existence)’ (Stapleton 2008).
Or similar discussions explored in Ferguson’s (2013) notion of ‘imagined agency’ and
his question of ‘to what extent does a musician perform the technology or does the
technology perform the musician?’ (Ferguson 2013, 141). Such conceptions of human/
instrument relations not only recognise the redistribution of agency amongst human
and non-human actors but start to question the notion of ﬁxed boundaries between
instrument and performers. Taking this idea further, Borgo borrows the term ‘conﬁgur-
ing’ from Actor Network Theory (Latour 2005) to describe a ‘mutually constitutive
process through which users, technologies, and environments are dynamically
engaged in refashioning one another in a feedback loop’ (Borgo and Kaiser 2010, 1–
2). These ‘mutually constitutive processes’ are very similar to how Evens characterises
the relationship between musicians and their instruments, not as something akin to
the relationship between a master and a slave but, rather, as a more ﬂuid intermingling
of liquid surfaces.
Again, there is a meeting of sonic surfaces, wherein the instrument extends itself to meet the
player’s touch while the player, through practice and technique and with tools, merges her
nervous system with the body of the instrument. Instrument and player intermingle at their
liquid surfaces, each dissolves its own boundaries, reorganizes itself, to eﬀect more engrossing
contact with the other and with the sonic result. (Evens 2005, 83)
In this conception, the instrument is not transparent, it does not disappear in use, the per-
former is not trying to master it; they are collaborating with it; adjusting and shaping
themselves in relation to it. This wider conception of musical instrumentality relates to
concepts of mutable boundaries between performer and instrument. As Norman puts it
‘[r]ather than being given over to users as ﬁnite objects or systems, they [musical instru-
ments] result from the coincidence, constant negotiation, and co-evolution of volition
and materials in a given place and time’ (Norman 2013, 281). This suggests a broader deﬁ-
nition of what an instrument is, one that is determined by a use function that is poly- and
multi-stable in its construction. I argue that this more post-phenomenological understand-
ing of the instrument performer relationship can be furthered through employing Ver-
beek’s notion of Cyborg Intentionality.
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Cyborg intentionality
Verbeek in Cyborg intentionality: Rethinking the phenomenology of human–technology
relations, describes Ihde’s formulations of technological relations as a form of mediated
intentionality, that ‘occurs when intentionality takes place ‘through’ technological artifacts’
(Verbeek 2008, 387). Verbeek argues that Ihde’s embodied and hermeneutic relations
blackbox the speciﬁc relations that can exist between humans and technology or technol-
ogies and the world. He is concerned in particular with Ihde’s deﬁnition of embodied and
hermeneutic relationships as these are more speciﬁcally about intentionality as they relate
to perceptions of the world. Verbeek is interested in interrogating more deeply the
relations between the humans and technology or technology and the world. These are
the interactions that are represented by the dashes in Ihde’s terminology; for example
(Human–Technology) → World.
As Verbeek writes in Introduction to Mediation theory (2015):
We should not see interaction as interaction between two ﬁxed objects. The humans and tech-
nologies are not ‘two poles’ between which there is an interaction; rather, they are the result of
this interaction. (Verbeek 2015, 28)
In Verbeek’s terms ‘[t]echnologies help shape human experiences and practices. Rather
than being external to human beings, they help deﬁne what it means to be human. Tech-
nologies help us develop our knowledge of the world, our moral actions and decisions,
and even our metaphysical and religious frameworks’ (Verbeek 2015, 30). He relates
these understandings of our relationships with technology to the notion of the cyborg
as it is deﬁned by authors such as Haraway (1991) and Hayles (1999). Theorists, who do
not support an intellectual position that maintains strong ontological boundaries
between technology and humans; but, rather, a blurring of these ontological boundaries
that itself supports constructions of ‘the self’ that are more ﬂuid and can incorporate tech-
nological artefacts. Drawing on this notion of the cyborg Verbeek seeks to extend Ihde’s
notion of mediated internationalities to those of cyborg internationalities in which the
intentionality ‘is partly constituted by the technology’ (Verbeek 2008, 390). Through this
reconceptualisation Verbeek introduces two new categories: hybrid intentionality; ‘in
which the human and the technological are merged into a new entity, rather than inter-
related’ and composite intentionality; ‘situations in which not only human beings have
intentionality, but also the technological artefacts they are using’ (Verbeek 2008, 390).
Taking Ihde’s understanding of the relationship above as a starting point:
Ihde’s embodied relation (human - technology) —> world, becomes the hybrid/cyborg
relation (human/technology) — > world, and the hermeneutic relation of
human —> (technology -world), becomes a composite relation of
human —> (technology—> world).
Hybrid intentionality
Verbeek’s notion of hybrid intentionality suggests that there is a true merging of instru-
ment and human to create a ‘new entity’, a cyborg – in which the association ‘physically
alters the human’(Verbeek 2008, 391). Such a conception challenges notions of self and
redeﬁnes the boundaries of the human so that they become indistinct as we become
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part of a larger complex system. In a hybrid intentionality, the human and technologies
form a new experiencing entity – rather than in the embodied relation where the ‘distinc-
tion can still be made between the human and the technological ‘share’ in the mediated
experience’ (Verbeek 2008, 291). Rather than a technology being used, the technology is
incorporated into the self and the human and technology can be thought of as becoming
one intentional object (McIntyre and Smith 1989). Technologies used, like telescopes and
hearing aids, help to constitute us as diﬀerent human beings, whereas technologies incor-
porated, constitute a new, hybrid being – which could, in principle, also use technologies
which help to constitute us as diﬀerent ‘transhumans’ (Verbeek 2008, 392).
Taking Ihde’s understanding of the relationship above as a starting point,
Ihde’s embodied relation of
(player - instrument) —> sound
can be reinterpreted, following Verbeek, as
(player/instrument) — > sound.
Verbeek’s notion of cyborg intentionality has a direct relationship with the language that
Evens uses to formulate his understanding of a performer/instrument relationship. The
merging of nervous systems, the intermingling of liquid surfaces, all suggest a co-
joined, co-deﬁned player instrument relationship where the player and the instrument
become one entity with ﬂuid boundaries. Such a deﬁnition implies that player instrument
relationship is also enactive in the sense that the boundaries of the player/instrument
become blurred and ﬂuid whilst they are re-conﬁgured in action.
Composite intentionality
In Verbeek’s notion of composite intentionality, both the technology and human have
intentionality: ‘the intentionalities of technological artefacts themselves play a central
role, in co-operation with the intentionalities of the human beings using these artefacts’
(Verbeek 2008, 392). Following Ihde and taking his examples from technologies that
extend perception, Verbeek states that ‘Technological intentionality’ here needs to be
understood as the speciﬁc ways in which speciﬁc technologies can be directed at
speciﬁc aspects of reality’. Verbeek cites Ihde’s example of the tape recorder ‘ﬂattening
out’ the recording by making the background levels seem louder than they are perceived
by humans. This is an example of how a recording of a soundscape aﬀects our perception
of it; that is, the technology aﬀects the way we perceive the world. ‘[O]ne could say the
composition of human intentionality and technological intentionality is directed at
making accessible ways in which technologies ‘experience’ the world’ (Verbeek 2008, 393).
In this instance, the hermeneutic relation of
player —> (instrument – sound),
can be reinterpret, following Verbeek, as
player—> instrument—> sound.
This conception of the player/instrument relationship ﬁts well with that of a resistive
instrument that exhibits levels of its own agency and intentionality. This relates well to
the dialogue instruments of Stapleton (2008) and the ‘Imagined Agency’ of Ferguson
(2013). Perhaps the stance that best illustrates this position is outlined in the following
extended quotation from Evan Parker regarding his relationship with his saxophone:
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You couple yourself to that instrument and it teaches you as much as you tell it what to do. So,
you’re sensitive to… how it’s responding to your eﬀorts to control it. By hearing it, the way it’s
feeding back to you, you learn to control it better. So, it’s a very dynamic and very sensitive
process. And the instrument at the same time seems to be giving you additional information.
So [there are] things that you have under your control, but every so often something will go
wrong. You’ll lose control. In that moment, you are given an opportunity to learn something
else that the instrument can do. Then gradually the nature of the instrument and its will—it
sounds a bit mystical—in relation to its destiny—it sounds Steinerian! [laughs] But let’s say the
saxophone has a destiny, has a will, and it has a set of intentions in its relationship with you,
and you start to ﬁnd it diﬃcult to distinguish yourself and your intentions from the instru-
ment’s intentions, or let’s say I’ve found it diﬃcult to do that. (Parker in Borgo 2014)
For Parker, the saxophone isn’t something to be mastered. Rather it is an object to enter
into a relationship with, something you ‘couple yourself to’. Also, Parker has a sense that
the instrument has its own intentionality and that a performance becomes a negotiation
between this instrumental intentionality and the performers intentionality.
The feral cello
To further illustrate the conception of the relationship with a musical instrument as a Com-
posite Intentionality I would like to outline an example of where an exploration of these
concerns has informed my own creative practice. The Feral Cello is a performance
system that I have been developing solo since Jan 2016, and most recently (since Oct
2016) in collaboration with composer and performer Laura Reid (2017). This system has
been utilised in a number of performance contexts, most notably NIME 2017, SMC 2017
and NoiseCore 2017 where it was used to perform the piece Gemmeleg, composed by
Reid (2017) (Figure 1).
The Feral Cello could be described as belonging to the family of actuated instruments
(Overholt 2011) and is also similar to IRCAM’s smart instruments (SMART), both of which
have the ability to redeﬁne the acoustic response of the instrument through employing
transducers situated on the body of an acoustic instrument. The Feral Cello is a normal
acoustic cello with a bridge-based acoustic pickup and a transducer (Visaton) attached
to the front of the instrument. The signal at the pickup (Gage 2018) is sent to a laptop
running Max (cycling’74 2017) software where a variety of digital signal processers are
applied to the sound and passed back through the acoustic body of the cello. In this
way, the sound world created by the cello can be altered in real time; either in subtle
ways, such as altering the acoustic response of the cello, or more explicitly, through enhan-
cing and extending the sounds possible for the cello to make. Although it is possible to
make the cello feedback through the pickup transducer system, in the collaboration
with Reid most of the time this feedback loop is a controlled so that the resulting
sound is mainly the clean cello plus the cello related electronics. The choice of the char-
acter of the signal processing applied is controlled by a machine learning algorithm pro-
grammed to recognise musical gestures recorded by the cellist. This is implemented
through the use of the zsa.descriptors2 (Malt and Jourdan 2009) library to carry out
audio feature analysis on features such as spectral centroid, spectral ﬂux, spectral bright-
ness and spectral rolloﬀ of the incoming sound. This data is then fed into IRCAM’s gesture
follower [gf] object which employs Hidden Markov Models for real-time gesture analysis
(Bevilacqua et al. 2009). The Max patch also implements signal processing employing
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techniques such as; delays, spectral freezing, granular synthesis and ﬁltering. These eﬀects
are applied to the original source sound and fed back through the body of the cello
through the transducer (Figure 2).
Prior to the performance, the cellist trains the system with pre-determined audio cues.
During the performance, the recognition of the cues is used to switch between diﬀerent
sound processing of the cello. As the pickup receives a combination of the acoustic cello
sound and the electronically altered sound, and there are inherent diﬀerences between
the performance of the gestures and the stored gestures, there is an instability in the
way that the machine learning algorithm responds to the performer’s input. This translates
into a performance system that has a level of unpredictability for the performer. In
essence, the cello alters its output (acoustic and electronic) in response to the performer’s
playing style, but not in a way that is totally predictable by the player. As such, this project
explicitly examines the notions of human–machine composite intentionality as described
by Verbeek.
This performance system has been consciously designed to resist the notion of instru-
mental mastery. The constant reconﬁguring of the instrument through changes to its
acoustic response pushes the performer to renegotiate their relationship to the instru-
ment live in the performance. The performer can never ‘get comfortable’ with the instru-
ment and as such the performer doesn’t slip into an embodied mode of interaction in
which the instrument becomes transparent; rather, the switching of the acoustic and
electronic output of the cello highlights the material resistances of the instrument to
the performer such that they are always real and present to the performer in the
moment of performance. Reid has found the system challenging to perform with.
Stating that in performing with the system ‘chaos is something that I have had to
come to terms with’ (Davis and Reid 2018), that it ‘is a little bit of a beast that may
not be tamed’ (Davis and Reid 2018) and that in performance situations the
Figure 1. Gemmeleg being performed on the Feral Cello SMC, Helsinki 2017.
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indeterministic nature of the system can ‘make you feel quite vulnerable’ (Davis and Reid
2018). One way for Reid to deal with this was to write a piece, Gemmeleg (hide and seek
in Danish), which employs a semi-structured improvisational arrangement to allow the
performer to perform with the system within some prescribed boundaries provided by
a score. As Reid states although there is some structure provided by the score ‘the elec-
tronics is never the same, and my response is never the same, only the openings are the
same’ (Davis and Reid 2018) The system is designed to exploit the notion of re-conﬁgur-
ation of the instrument in real-time to push the performer to explore the instrument in
diﬀerent ways in every performance.
Using Ihde’s terminology, the performance system can be interpreted in a number of
ways. As the system is designed such that machine learning algorithm is ‘making
decisions’ about the reactions of the instrument, constantly thwarting the performers
intentions, it could be conceptualised as an instance of Ihde’s alterity relation, the technol-
ogy ‘as other’ (Ihde 1990, 97). This conﬁguration suggests a separate pre-existing human
and technology with clear distinct boundaries, ‘the other’ with which we interact. In con-
trast to this, a post-humanist viewpoint would allow for a more ﬂuid description of tech-
nologies and their boundaries such that the technology and humans are not pre-existing
entities but are co-constituted through their interaction.
If we conceptualise the instrument/performer as one system we can think of the cello
performer as one entity, in Verbeek’s terminology we could write this relationship as:
player/instrument → sound.
Figure 2. Block Diagram of software hardware relationships within the Feral Cello.
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This is particularly pertinent for the Feral Cello. This instrument itself has un-deﬁned
boundaries. Although an acoustic cello could be considered in itself a conﬁned entity,
an instance of Norman’s ‘frozen agency’, described and conﬁned by its bodily construc-
tion, the Feral Cello expands on this deﬁnition by adding algorithms running on computer
hardware, as well as sensors and actuators that physically alter the response of the cello
itself. Following Waters (2007), we can question the self-evident boundaries between,
instrument and performance environment and rather consider the system as a ‘perform-
ance ecosystem’ that takes into account the changing bodily relationship of the performer
to the cello in the real time of performance, as well as the response of the system to its
wider context, the space within which it is performing. Although this conception of con-
joining of player and instrument can feel like a collapsing of entities, really it is a celebra-
tion of re-distributions and multiplications of agency (Norman 2013, 282), for it is only
through recognising the agency of the cello within the system that we can make the
cyborg construction.
The Feral Cello can also be interpreted as an instance of Verbeek’s composite intention-
ality, where we can consider the intentionality of the performer as mediated through the
intentionality of the technology:
player—> instrument—> sound.
Verbeek characterises this kind of mediation as one in which we become aware of how
technologies are ‘experiencing’ the world (Verbeek 2008, 393). Within this context we
can think of the Feral Cello as making ‘decisions’ about its audio output through an
interpretation of its sensory input, i.e. its intentionality is based on its understanding of
its own ‘lived experience’. This raises interesting questions about how the machine is
making decisions and based on what data, how is it classifying the incoming audio.
When we train the algorithm, we are looking for features that diﬀerentiate the musical ges-
tures from each other. We then programme the system to look for patterns in these fea-
tures to make the correct feature selection. There is no getting away from the fact that this
is a process of mapping from a human understanding of musical features to a machine
understanding of musical features, and it could well be the case that in the process of per-
formance the Feral Cello will make selections that are the best ﬁt based on its machine
understanding, its own intentionality, that do not necessarily correspond to our own
human interpretation of the music. These discrepancies are what makes the system inter-
esting and act as a catalyst for the improvisational nature of the music. Such consider-
ations are useful in terms of improvisation theory, as the coupling of the cello to the
performer provides an unknown to spring oﬀ from. It helps the performers get away
from themselves to approach every performance anew. The Feral Cello can thus be con-
sidered as a physical example of a system where ‘human and non-human actors are
equal contributors, rather than ‘agnostic, oppositional concepts of mastery’ (Norman
2013, 282).
Final thoughts
The post-phenomenological conception of the musical instrument challenges the notion
of a musical instruments as a frozen agency to be activated as transparent conveyances of
the musical intention of a performer. Rather, they posit the instrument-player boundary as
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ﬂuid sites of negotiation where the boundaries of the performer/instrument can be inter-
preted as a co-joined, multi-stable assemblage of items. A boundary, where there is a
melding of the machine and human, the instrument and the performer that recognises,
to paraphrase Borgo, the organic as part of the cybernetic. (Borgo 2014). In this con-
ception, the player/instrument assemblage has a combined intentionality towards the cre-
ation of the sound. Such that the resultant sound is the product of the intertwined
meshing and mixing of these entities as one. In this way, following Evens’ (2005, 83) ter-
minology, the intermingling of the liquid surfaces is made evident.
Notes
1. Free improvisation is a musical movement that strives to play without rules. It grew out of a
Jazz tradition in the early 60s and is deﬁned by Derek Bailey as music that ‘has no stylistic or
idiomatic commitment. It has no prescribed idiomatic sound’(Bailey 1992, 83).
2. zsa.descriptors is a library for the programming language Max that enables real-time analysis
of spectral properties of sound.
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